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TAGS: [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [IR](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-US MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER
10, 2007, PART 1 OF 2: PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT REGIONAL
MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[¶1.](#) (S) Summary. In extensive discussions in Moscow October 10, U.S. and Russian delegations, led by Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak discussed the U.S. plans to place a missile defense system (MD) in Eastern Europe (delegation lists at paras. 24-25). The U.S. presented its concept for a Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture, which would offer Russia the opportunity to work with the U.S. and participating European countries on MD from the ground up, would include defense of the United States, Europe, and Russia west of the Urals, and would include integrated command and control.

[¶2.](#) (S) Summary continued. The two sides also assessed the visit to the Qabala radar on September 18, and exchanged threat assessments, but made little progress in narrowing the differences. The U.S. briefed on the physical characteristics of the X-band radar system to be deployed in the Czech Republic, demonstrating why the radar could not support interception against Russian ICBMs. The Russian side reiterated familiar arguments discounting the threat from Iran, arguing that the system was directed against Russia, and pressing for suspension of deployment of the Czech radar and interceptor elements in Poland. At conclusion of the talks, however, the Russian side did not dismiss the concept or state that the report to Ministers for the "2 2" meeting would indicate that no progress had been made. (Qabala, Iran threat, and Czech Radar Capabilities briefings reported septel). End summary.

The Presidents' Vision

[¶3.](#) (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak opened the October 10, 2007, session of "2 2" preparatory negotiations by referring to the President and Putin's instructions to deepen cooperation and to identify a way forward on MD cooperation. Noting the previous sessions in July and September, Kislyak said that "we can't congratulate ourselves on our great progress." Kislyak identified the session's tasks as reviewing the Qabala visit, comparing and evaluating threat information on Iran, and then assessing where the talks stood. Rood agreed and stressed the need to prepare for the 2 2 ministerial discussions, noting the unusual opportunity presented by the joint visit of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

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[¶4.](#) (C) Rood stressed the potential for bilateral cooperation. While thanking the Russians for hosting the

visit to Qabala, Rood proposed that it was time to narrow differences and identify areas of convergence on threat assessments. He stressed that cooperation should not be held hostage to such an agreement and that there should be no preconditions for engagement on MD. Referencing the proposal to share networked radar and sensor data, which was conveyed on September 10, Rood pointed to the potential interoperability of the U.S. and Russian shorter-range mobile MD systems, such as the S-300, S-400, Patriot PAC-3, and THAAD; urged the establishment of centers for transmitting and receiving sensor data; and flagged arrangements for command and control. The U.S. and Russia could become real strategic partners, with Russia gaining increased confidence in the initiative through its engagement. Referring to the Russian concerns on sites in the Czech Republic and Poland, Rood said that the placement of the X-band radar and interceptors was a question of physics and geometry, and not a matter of foreign policy.

¶5. (C) Rood turned to General O'Reilly of the Missile Defense Agency to give the U.S. assessment of the Qabala radar facility and the capabilities of the X-band radar, and to Senior Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozluský to brief on the threat from Iran (septel).

Russian Opening: U.S. Plans an "Unfriendly Gesture"

¶6. (S) Following the technical briefings, Kislyak began the second session by stating Russia and the U.S. were going in circles. Russia had not received a response to the July proposal, which laid out Putin's views of how we could proceed together. The U.S.'s insistence on continuing its plans to deploy radars and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland was seen as an "unfriendly gesture" by the GOR. Russia's proposal was to create a scheme of interaction

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together which would not pose a threat to or damage any party, including Russia. The U.S. system threatens and damages Russia. He said the U.S.'s double track of discussions with Russia, while simultaneously continuing with development of the Polish and Czech sites, was going in the wrong direction politically. The U.S.'s decisions were not being influenced by the U.S.-Russian talks. Kislyak noted that the atmosphere of the meeting was good, but there was no progress. Putin had told President Bush that the double track approach was not acceptable. Kislyak said if the U.S.'s new ideas met Russia's criteria for cooperation, Russia would want more clarity on the substance of the ideas.

¶7. (S) Rood responded that the U.S. system was not directed at Russia, and was not intended as an unfriendly act. U.S.-Russian relations were not what they were in the past, and the U.S. does not see Russia as a foe. The U.S. viewed the discussions more positively. It was significant that this was the first time, Rood said, that the U.S. and Russia were having such a detailed exchange of intelligence information. President Bush was serious about wanting to work out cooperation on MD with Russia. Rood noted that Russia had not responded to the U.S. paper he provided to Kislyak on April 17 in Moscow on missile defense cooperation. While neither side had responded to each other's proposals in writing, our discussions in September had taken Russia's proposal into account and sought to respond to issues raised therein. The U.S. was prepared to propose a Joint Regional MD Architecture, which would be a real partnership, entailing joint command and control, and would take our cooperation well beyond anything that had been done before. In response to Russia's concerns, the U.S. was also prepared to show why the radar in the Czech Republic was physically incapable of detecting and intercepting Russia's ICBMs, and why the interceptor site in Poland could not affect Russia's strategic capability.

"We Know the System is Directed at Russia"

18. (S) General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated emphatically "We are convinced everything you are designing is aimed at Russia's retaliatory nuclear capability. Do not try to convince me this is not directed at Russia." He said he understood that the intent of the entire MD system was to intercept all missiles aimed at the U.S., regardless of their origin. Thus, the system was directed at Russia. With respect to the threat from Iran, Baluyevskiy said "we're convinced this belongs to the sphere of science fiction." Even if there were a threat from Iran, Russia had offered the use of the Qabala radar station, and would offer Armavir in the future. Both radars could detect threats from Iran. He argued that the U.S. and Russia should "take a break" and invite other countries to develop a system of monitoring. He contended that, while the U.S. might be planning today to have only 10 missile interceptors in Poland, in the future, it could be 110.

19. (S) Rood responded that the U.S. did not feel the need to have a capability against Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. He explained that the physics of the radar and the plan for only 10 interceptors in Poland could not defeat thousands of Russian nuclear warheads. He noted that both sides were drawing political conclusions based on technical differences, and suggested that the experts try to narrow the technical differences. He added that, had the U.S. planned a system to counter Russia, it would not be the system the U.S. was proposing. This system was based on the threat assessment of a missile threat from Iran. It would continue to be developed based on the threat assessments as they occur and change. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman said that the U.S.'s MD system would take many years to build and would require funding from Congress. The best guarantee that the system would not be aimed at Russia would be for Russia to work jointly with us.

A Joint Regional MD Architecture

110. (S) Rood presented the U.S. proposal for Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture. He explained that, on April 17, the U.S. had offered cooperation with Russia across the full spectrum of MD, including on sensors, subsystems, interoperability of forces, modeling and interpretation. In September, we had built on Putin's proposal, taking Russia's questions and concerns into account, and offered to provide technical data and to develop shared early warning centers.

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This new proposal took our cooperation further. The objective of the proposal was to defend the U.S., Europe and Russia west of the Urals from a ballistic missile attack. All participating countries would contribute assets, and each country's individual capabilities would be used to build the system step-by-step.

111. (S) O'Reilly, using slides, described the proposed architecture. A U.S.-Europe-Russia complementary architecture could be so robust that it would dissuade Iran from developing missile capabilities and would deter Iran from launching an attack. The baseline included upgrades to the early warning radars in Thule and Fylingdales, a European midcourse X-band radar (EMR) in the Czech Republic (range approximately 1000 km), ground based interceptors (2-stage) in Poland, and command and control based in Colorado Springs. O'Reilly then described the components that would be available between the U.S. and Russia in 2010-2012, including both sides' sensors, sensors with interceptors, interceptors, and command and control. The steps of an integrated architecture would include:

-- Step 1 - Partial integration of Russian radars, with each system operating autonomously, but with data sharing between the systems, including protocols, message sets, coordination,

and better early-warning capability. But it would not enable each side to fire interceptors sooner;

-- Step 2 - Full integration. The Russians would use U.S. data to expand the range of its sensors, and the U.S. would do the same with Russian data. By integrating fire control systems and deconflicting command and control systems, both sides would get be able to launch interceptors sooner. This would also give the Russians significantly greater capability in depth. Both sides would still have control over their own forces, but by sharing data and deconflicting, we would ensure that neither side wasted its resources against the same threat.

A True Partnership with Russia

¶12. (S) Rood explained that this was a proposed first take on an integrated system and, if Russia was interested in pursuing the concept, the U.S. would welcome Russia's views on how to change it. He added that the proposal was significant because it provided integrated command and control, something the U.S. had never offered before. And it enabled Russia to get in at the beginning of the development of a MD system, and to affect that development. Russia often complained about being given plans already decided; this was Russia's opportunity to work with the U.S. from the ground floor up.

¶13. (S) Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried said that the U.S.'s offer was unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S. was not proposing two parallel systems, closely linked, but an open offer for joint cooperation, and joint command and control. In September, Russia had asked: 1) how do we know the system is not directed at Russia, and 2) how do we know it will not be developed in the future to be used against Russia. In response to the first question, the U.S. side had shown in its briefing the physics that demonstrated the impossibility that the system could be used against Russia. As to the second question, the U.S. proposal offered Russia the ability to participate in the development of the system, which would allow Russia to ensure that it would not be developed in a way that it could be used against Russia.

Familiar Russian Objections

¶14. (S) The Russian side raised familiar arguments. Baluyevskiy immediately asked how much such a system would cost Russia. He asked for a feasibility study on the costs. He asked if the Europeans knew the U.S. proposed to cover Russia west of the Urals. He asked who would take decisions on the use of the interceptors. He asked if the U.S. and Russia would coordinate actions if Iran were to launch a missile. The U.S. was trying to minimize threats by proposing a regional ABM system against a threat that did not exist, and ignoring other options, including destruction of a missile on the launch pad. Putin had proposed that the U.S. and Russia jointly assess the threat from the South, and use the existing radars in Qabala and Armavir. All interested

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countries could participate in the decisions. Why did the U.S. need to rush ahead with deployment of a system in Poland and the Czech Republic?

¶15. (S) Kislyak, echoing Baluyevskiy, contended that the U.S. was proposing to unite all the participants against Iran, but Russia has not agreed that Iran poses a threat. The U.S. proposal amounted to an alliance against Iran. He asked if it was directed only against Iran, or designed to protect against all other risks. He asked if command and control decisions would continue to be taken in Colorado Springs. He said that, contrary to the statement that the

best guarantee that the system would not be aimed at Russia would be for Russia to sit at the table, the U.S. was still going ahead with deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, whether Russia liked it or not. Would the U.S. be prepared to discuss with other NATO members a system that was not based in Poland and the Czech Republic? Kislyak said, despite Russia's repeated statements that basing a system in those two countries was of major concern to Russia, the U.S. and NATO continued to pursue deployment there. Russia's proposal for a different architecture, not based in Poland and the Czech Republic, had been discarded. Even if Russia accepted Rood's offer to provide its views on how the architecture could be changed, he doubted that the U.S. would agree on architecture that did not include Poland and the Czech Republic.

¶16. (S) Kislyak responded that Russia had suggested development of a MD system to NATO years ago, based on the U.S., NATO, and Russia, each having its own capability, but working together to determine what needed to be done. The U.S. was proposing a system aimed at Iran. While Russia acknowledged Iran posed a proliferation risk, Iran did not pose a threat. Iranians were "peculiar people with peculiar views, but they were reasonable and capable of not entertaining the idea of war against the U.S. or Europe." The U.S. was moving quickly as if a threat existed. Russia proposes a different concept: A system that offers protection from all risks. The U.S. and Russia should build a monitoring system together, based on the radars that already exist in Qabala and Armavir. If risks develop, then the U.S. and Russia can take action jointly. The U.S. proposal to place the system in Poland and the Czech Republic does not meet these criteria. All Russian experts agree: The U.S. is building a global system, but for the first time it is located near to Russia.

If Russia Agrees to the Concept, We Can Discuss Details

¶17. (S) In response to the questions about cost and command and control, Rood said we did not have detailed cost estimates yet, but if Russia agreed to the concept, we could discuss costs. He asked if there was a certain cost or command and control option that would make the overall concept interesting to Russia. While these questions of cost and command and control were important, they could be handled by experts if we could agree to go forward with the concept. O'Reilly noted that the proposal was based, as much as possible, on existing capabilities, and was not intended to go beyond the current U.S. MD budget. Edelman said that while the original provisional decision had been made to place command and control in Colorado Springs, if we were to develop the integrated system the U.S. is proposing, the question would be revisited.

¶18. (S) Edelman noted that Putin, in his letter to President Bush after the meeting in Kennebunkport, had acknowledged that the U.S. and Russia shared the view that there was an emerging threat from Iran. Nothing would get the Iranians' attention more than the U.S. and Russia working together, just as we were in the UN over Iran's nuclear program. This would be an important strategic shift in how we deal with Iran.

¶19. (S) Rood explained that the U.S.'s concerns about the Russian proposal was that it only encompassed joint threat monitoring, not full MD architecture. And Russia was only prepared to discuss this further if we agreed to suspend deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. There were layers of conditions in Russia's proposal. The U.S. proposal, by contrast, invited Russia to join at the beginning of development of MD architecture. Fried added that deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic were elements of this architecture, and Russia, if it joined, would have a say in how those deployments developed. Edelman

reiterated the U.S. offer for Russia to send a team to Kwajalein to see the radar system which will be put in the Czech Republic.

¶20. (S) Kislyak questioned whether the U.S. would cease MD deployments if a diplomatic solution was found to eliminate the threat from Iran, saying that he considered it doubtful.

U.S.: "We Are Not Adversaries"

¶21. (S) Rood underscored that Russia's position seemed to be based on the idea that the U.S. and Russia were adversaries, and our nuclear weapons were aimed at each other. The U.S. would prefer to see MD as a joint cooperative effort, from the ground up, to address the threats against us both. Fried noted that President Putin had opened up the possibility of far-reaching cooperation when he offered the use of the Qabala radar station, and the U.S. is very serious about wanting to develop such cooperation.

Russia Will Consider Proposal

¶22. (S) Kislyak said "whether we like it or not, thank you for your proposal." He said the GOR would need to study it. He reiterated that the proposal was being offered on the backdrop of a program that concerns Russia. Whether to deconflict the two was up to the U.S. He said he did not know if there would be much zeal to work on the U.S.'s proposal while the U.S. continued to do something Russia did not like. He said "are you ready to suspend the program my President has told you does not serve Russia's security interests? I am concerned this conflict is standing in the way of us working together." He said he did not understand why the U.S. was in such a rush to deploy in eastern Europe.

¶23. (S) Rood responded that he hoped our areas of disagreement could be lessened. The U.S. hoped to finish the deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic in six years, which was not a short time, given the intelligence assessment of the threat from Iran. All the U.S. was hearing from the Russian side was if we stopped negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic, if we forgo space based systems, if we adhered to Russian's conditions, Russia might be willing to continue the discussions we are having now. The U.S. had not heard a commitment from the Russian side to engage in a joint MD architecture. Was Russia willing to do so?

Participants

¶24. (SBU) U.S.: Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood (Head of delegation), Ambassador Burns, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, Major General Patrick O'Reilly, Deputy Director, Missile Defense Agency, EUR DAS David Kramer, DASD Brian Green, NSC Senior Director Mary Warlick, T Senior Advisor James Timbie, T Chief of Staff Hugh Amundson, Paul Iarrobino, Deputy, Missile Defense Policy Office, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, Col. Jon Chicky, OSD, Col. Chris King, Military Asst., Scott Roenicke, JCS J5, Daniel Lally, MDA, Mark King, OSD, Richard Trout, Regional Expert, Robert Kozlusk, Senior Intelligence Analyst, William Shobert, MD Del Exec. Secretary, Interpreters, Embassy notetakers.

¶25. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak (Head of delegation), General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Igor Neverov, Director, MFA North America Department, Vladimir Venevtsev, SVR, Viktor Golovkin, SVR, General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MOD Chief of Directorate, International Treaty, Yevgeniy Ilyin, MOD International Treaty Directorate, Oleg Burmistrov, Deputy Director, MFA, North America Department, Sergey Koshelev, Deputy Director, MFA Department on Security and Disarmament

(DVBR), Vasiliy Boryak, MFA DVBR, Aleksey Ivanov, MFA North America Department, Aleksandr Khomenko, MFA North America Department, Yelena Loboda, MFA North America Department.

Comment

¶26. (S) While staying on message, the Russian side seemed to want to be able to report to Ministers for the 2 2 that the issue was at an impasse. By the end of the meeting and the

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presentation on joint regional MD architecture, it appeared that they could no longer do so.

¶26. (U) Acting U/S Rood has cleared this cable.
Burns